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Preface
The value of this book is that its complex structure unifies three different subjects,
each of which would itself raise considerable interest: criminal inquiries, transna-
tional judicial cooperation, and fundamental rights.
This research has been carried out at a historical moment in which we are
witnessing a strengthening of transnational judicial cooperation as essential
means to fight against the expansion of criminal organizations that profit from
their ability to operate across borders. These are – alongside organizations nurturing
political terrorism, sometimes even working closely with them – the criminal
groups behind the most serious economic and financial crime, those controlling
among other things both production and smuggling of drugs and human trafficking.
The danger of new transnational crime has helped overcome traditional resis-
tance to a strengthened and more efficient international cooperation between
domestic states, which have always been jealous of their own sovereignty over
everything concerned with the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. These resistances
continue to be felt, and those that are still justified must be separated from those
which are simply the remnants of obsolete nationalist mentalities. However, this is
not the field in which the international community and its individual components
are facing the most serious challenge as they try to improve and strengthen their
instruments for combating transnational organized crime through international
cooperation.
For at least 30 years I have argued that the issue of fundamental rights cannot be
dealt with theoretically and handled practically as if the only question at stake were
that of elevating the threshold of untouchable individual guarantees entailed by any
of them. In particular, one cannot rule out that the increase of terroristic threats
should lead to partially rethinking even the extension of some individual freedoms
currently considered “fundamental.”
This would not, however, be the same as sharing the logic of “a` la guerre comme
a` la guerre,” according to which any mode of fighting against terrorism and other
dangerous forms of organized crime should be admissible, even in contempt of
most fundamental rights.
vii
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Fundamental rights are not a flag one can wave only under a shining sun. They
are the main sail which must always be protected without being lowered even when
a storm arises. For instance, it is significant that the European Convention on
Human Rights distinguishes, within the sphere of the rights it deals with as
fundamental, between those that can be suspended or limited in exceptional
circumstances (albeit, of course, compensated by some “institutional” guarantees)
“in time of war or other public emergency” and other rights which can never be
either suspended or limited.
It is not my task to enter into the merits of the approaches to these problems of
the various contributions of this book. However, focusing on these problems and
involving so many outstanding scholars to provide information and express their
opinions thereon are a credit both to the contributors and to the editor of this project.
Torino, Italy Mario Chiavario
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Abstract The paper contains a short overview of the Hungarian criminal justice
(authorities, stages etc.), but it focused on the transnational modus operandi of
investigating authorities. In this sense the paper describes and analyses the very
important bilateral instruments of combatting cross border crimes within the frame-
work of Schengen conventions.
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The second part of the report deals with the issue of transnational evidence
gathering and obtaining, and with the principle of mutual recognition. The paper
elaborates the neutral (‘judgement-less’) model of mutual recognition which could
lead to more effective human rights protection in the field of transnational inquiries.
Abbreviations
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
CCP Code of Criminal Procedure
CISA Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement
ECAT European Convention against Torture
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EEW European Evidence Warrant
FD EEW Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant
ICAT International Covenant against Torture
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
SIS Schengen Information System
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
1 Introductory Remarks
1.1 The Criminal Justice System in Hungary: An Overview
In Hungary, like in most European countries, the criminal justice system
consists of three branches: agencies (1) for law enforcement, (2) for law
adjudication and also (3) for the carrying out of punishment. These roles are
fulfilled by the police, the prosecution service, and the judicial and correctional
agencies, respectively.
The general investigating authority is the police. The National Tax and Customs
Office also has investigative competences related to special criminal offences under
Article 36 of the Hungarian CCP (e.g. misuse of excise duty; tax fraud; false
marking of goods and certain other economic crimes). The Border Guard was the
third body in Hungary charged with investigating special criminal offences (e.g.
trafficking in human beings) in the period from 1997 to 2008, but following
Hungary’s accession to the Schengen Area within the European Union, it was
integrated into the structure of the police force that simultaneously also took over
its investigative competencies.
The Public Prosecution Service has a clearly defined independent position
among the state organs in Hungary, one which is guaranteed by the Fundamental
420 K. Karsai
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Law (Constitution). The General Public Prosecutor is elected by the Parliament on
the suggestion of the President of the Republic; thus, the Prosecution Service is
entirely independent of the Government and the Minister of Interior, unlike in
numerous European countries. The General Public Prosecutor, the chief of the
prosecution authority, is not under anyone’s authority but has the duty to report
on the activity of the prosecution service to the Parliament.
When the investigating authority, i.e. the police, conducts an investigation
independently, the prosecutor supervises its compliance with the Hungarian CCP.
In so doing, the prosecutor may order an investigation, may instruct the
investigating authority to perform further investigative actions, may be present at
investigative actions, and may examine or send for the documents produced during
the investigation. The prosecutor can exercise his right to intervene in the investi-
gation whenever he considers it necessary to do so.
However, the Hungarian CCP sets forth the criminal offences the investigation
of which falls within the exclusive competence of the prosecutor, including,
without limitation, crimes against justice or bribery. The prosecutor has exclusive
investigative competency in cases where either the offender or the victim of the
offence is a Member of Parliament, a high public dignitary elected by the Parlia-
ment, a judge, a prosecutor or a member of the police.1
Transnational enquiries can engage both the police and the public prosecutor’s
office. if ever, involved.
In the criminal justice system of Hungary, there are no discrete investigative
jurisdictions. The law uses the notion of investigating judge, but their role is not the
same as that of their more familiar counterparts in France or in Belgium. The main
competence of investigating judges is namely to perform the responsibilities of the
court prior to the filing of the indictment e.g. to decide onmotions concerning coercive
measures falling within the competence of the court or decide on covert surveillance.
The independence of the trial jurisdiction is guaranteed by the rule by which the judge
acting as an investigating judge in the case is excluded from subsequent court
procedures. It means that the Hungarian concept of investigating judge is understood
to be a judge of freedom. The fact that the judge lacks the authority to investigate
independently in either the national or transnational context also means that the judge
can only interact with foreign authorities via requests for mutual judicial assistance.
1.2 The Structural Place of Transnational Inquiries in the Legal
System
In order to talk about “transnational inquiries,” it is first of all necessary to define
the concept. For the purposes of my discussion transnational enquiries are the
transnational acts of investigating authorities, i.e. investigating actions that have
1Karsai (2008), pp. 11 ff.
Report on Hungary 421
karsai.krisztina@juris.u-szeged.hu
one or more foreign elements. In the context of a national legal system, the question
of transnational inquiries can arise in four aspects:
1) If the national authorities get “foreign aid” in their own investigations
2) If or whether national authorities/officers can investigate abroad
3) If the national authorities give “aid” to foreign investigations
4) If or whether foreign authorities/officers can investigate on the soil of another
state.
The list shows that I prefer the use of a narrow definition: only the very acts of
investigation in a narrow sense pertain to the definition, other acts of legal assistance
do not. However, this project has widened the definition of inquiry: the Hungarian
concept of investigation normally excludes police cooperation before the opening the
criminal proceedings because the investigation is the formal part of the opened
criminal procedure according to Hungarian CCP. However, this project requires
wider engagement with the whole field of transnational cooperation; therefore, it is
necessary to extend the report to cover the pre-procedural phase (in a formal sense).
I use the term “transnational inquiries” with such content in the written paper as well.
In Hungary, every office and contact point for international police cooperation is
connected in an institutional way: 15 years ago, the International Law Enforcement
Cooperation Centre (ORFK NEBEK) was established as an element of the organiza-
tional structure of the General Directorate of Criminal Investigation of the National
Police Office. The unit is comprised of five divisions: the International Information
Division, the Europol National Unit, the Europol Hungarian Liaison Bureau, the
Interpol National Central Bureau and the SIRENE Bureau. The ORFK NEBEK has
a 24/7 duty service, it receives and processes criminal investigation requests from
abroad and takes the necessary measures as a matter of urgency. In cases of actual
crimes, it exchanges information with Europol and Interpol; furthermore it operates a
Liaison Bureau in The Hague to support domestic operational activities, where liaison
officers of the Police and the Customs and Finance Guard work in the same offices.
However, the Centre also handles operational cooperation, for which the necessary
information is retrieved, inter alia, from the Schengen Information System (SIS).
The NEBEK is a very effective unit of international cooperation; it handles ca.
270,000 issues or requests a year. The largest share of requests involves those
relevant to data-exchange with Interpol (74,000 in 2010).2
1.3 Overview of Rules of Investigation Concerning Transnational
Issues
Hungary, as a Member state of the EuropeanUnion, is obliged to cooperate within the
existing framework of theAFSJ.Because of itsmembership in the Schengen enhanced
2 Source: on individual request from International Law Enforcement Cooperation Centre, April
2011.
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cooperation, Hungary furthermore follows the Schengen Acquis as well. National law
contains every source of Union law; it is not necessary to include a detailed listing
here.3 Besides European Union law, Hungary has accepted and ratified several
international instruments of the United Nations and the Council of Europe.
The special cooperation rules with foreign or international investigating
authorities are laid down by Act 54 of 2002 on the International Cooperation of
Investigating Authorities, and—with focus on data exchange—Act 54 of 1999 on
the Cooperation and Information Exchange with Europol and Interpol. Meanwhile,
the general law of criminal procedure is set forth in Act 19 of 1998. The general
rules of mutual assistance with other countries in criminal cases are set out in Act 38
of 1996 on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Equivalent rules for the
European Union are set forth by Act 130 of 2003 on Cooperation in Criminal
Matters between the Member states of the European Union.
These acts contain almost every European requirement; only the FD EEW has
not yet been implemented, preventing the EEW from applying in Hungary so far.
Instead of the EEW, general mutual assistance continues to apply in the field
otherwise covered by EEW.
Hungarian participation in investigative cooperation at EU level is the same as
that of other Member states: the Hungarian police sends liaison officers to Europol
and supports any requests for data exchange or other forms of cooperation. The
investigative cooperation is however not really effective with partners from outside
of the EU. The only functioning “investigative” method is cooperation through the
framework of Interpol; otherwise, the general means of mutual assistance (legal
assistance) by involving at least the public prosecution is not really effective. The
practical obstacle is the excessive time that it takes to complete any request for
assistance from another state.
1.4 Bilateral Agreements in Transnational Inquiries
Hungary is a country with seven neighbours: Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia,
Romania, Ukraine and Slovakia. Three of these neighbours are members of both the
EU and the Schengen Area (Austria, Slovakia, and Slovenia), one is a EU member
state without Schengen (security) membership (Romania), and three others are not
EU member states (Serbia, Croatia and Ukraine). This special geopolitical and legal
situation requires special attention. It means that Hungary is bound by both global
(international) instruments and EU law, but it has contracted special bilateral
agreements with almost every other neighbouring state in the fight against cross-
border criminality.
The aforementioned bilateral agreements with neighbouring states are also very
important in the fight against crime. These bilateral agreements go beyond the
3Concerning the relevant norms see Hecker (2010), pp. 159–206, 367–455; Klip (2009),
pp. 157–208.
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special Schengen police cooperation in case of Romania,4 Slovakia,5 Slovenia6 and
Austria7 as well—like the cross-border surveillance and cross-border hot pursuit
(Arts. 40-40 CISA). Of particular recent importance is the conclusion between
Hungary and Croatia8 of an agreement with almost “Schengen-content,”9 which
means in particular that cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit are also allowed
and regulated even though Croatia is not yet a member of the Union. The bilateral
agreement between Hungary and Serbia10 does not contain such modern Europe-
shaped features; it follows the lines of traditional cross-border cooperation.
It would be easy to assume that all the agreements between Hungary and its
neighbouring EU member states have the same content, but that would be a
mistake. On the base of the following tables I compare the agreements from three
aspects: (1) cross-border surveillance, (2) cross-border hot pursuit and (3) the legal
possibility that officers can act abroad in their duty. All of these aspects examined
are fruits of European integration; therefore, the content of their regulation (in these
agreements) could be a plausible indicator of the overall level of cooperation.
1.4.1 Cross-Border Surveillance
Cross-border surveillance
State Trigger offences Where? How long?
Art. 40
SAAC
Certain severe offences (not every
EAW offence)
Austria
(Art. 10) 2006
EAW offences Whole territory Max. 5 h without
prior permission
Slovakia
(Art. 12) 2006
Offences with min. 5 years
imprisonment or organised crimes
(no special regulation, therefore
according to law of departure state)
Whole territory Max. 5 h without
prior permission
(continued)
4 Act 63 of 2009 on the promulgation of the Agreement on preventing and combating cross-border
crimes between the Governments of Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Romania.
5 Act 91 of 2006 on the promulgation of the Agreement on preventing cross-border crimes and
combating organised crime between the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and the
Republic of Slovakia.
6 Act 108 of 2006 on the promulgation of the Agreement on cross-border cooperation of
investigating authorities between the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Slovenia.
7 Act 37 of 2006 on the promulgation of the Agreement on preventing and combating cross-border
crime between the Governments of The Republic of Hungary and the Federal Republic of Austria.
8 Act 66 of 2009 on preventing and combating cross-border crime between the Governments of the
Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Croatia.
9 See Hecker (2010), pp. 171–179.
10 Act 34 of 2009 on the promulgation of the Agreement on the cooperation of investigating
authorities in the field of preventing cross-border crimes and combating organised crime between
the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Serbia.
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State Trigger offences Where? How long?
Slovenia
(Art. 11) 2006
Offences with min. 5 years
imprisonment or organised crimes
(no special regulation, therefore
according to law of departure state)
Whole territory Max. 5 h without
prior permission
Romania
(Art. 12) 2009
Offences with min. 5 years
imprisonment (double
punishability) or organised crimes
Whole territory Max. 5 h without
prior permission
Croatia
(Art. 12) 2009
Offences with min. 1 year
imprisonment or organised crimes
(law of departure state)
Whole territory Max. 5 h without
prior permission
I would like to point out that despite the common regulation of the CISA the
chosen options are quite different in the five agreements:
– The category of EAW offences is generally broader than that of offences with a
minimum of 5 years imprisonment
– The requirement of double punishability is a crucial point (with Romania) in
comparison with the other instruments
– The use of the vague term of “organised crime” opens the door in almost every
case to the imposition of double punishability. That means also only the law of
the departure state is taken into consideration.
In 2010 there were 16 registered cases for cross-border surveillance: 3 between
Hungary and Austria, 3 with Slovakia, and 2 with Slovenia 2; 1 from Austria to
Hungary, 2 from Romania, and 4 from Slovakia.11
1.4.2 Cross-Border Hot Pursuit
The next table contains a comparison of the rules in the field of cross-border hot
pursuit.
State Trigger offences Where? How long?
Art. 41 SAAC Certain severe offences (not every EAW
offence) and extraditable offences
Austria
(Art. 11) 2006
EAW offences Whole territory Without temporal
restriction
Slovakia
(Art. 13) 2006
Offences with min. 1 year imprisonment
(double punishability)
Whole territory Without temporal
restriction
Slovenia
(Art. 12) 2006
EAW offences Whole territory Without temporal
restriction
Romania
(Art. 13) 2009
EAW offences Whole territory Without temporal
restriction
Croatia
(Art. 13) 2009
Offences with min. 1 year imprisonment
(double punishability)
Whole territory Without temporal
restriction
11 Source: on individual request from the International Law Enforcement Cooperation Centre,
April 2011.
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There are real differences concerning the scope of the offences covered as well:
the EAW covers offences with a minimum of 1 year imprisonment requiring double
punishability, but EAW offences also comprise crimes (listed offences) where
double punishability shall not be required and the minimal imprisonment term is
3 year (as a maximum). It is also noteworthy, that the agreement with Croatia
extends to this original Schengen-shaped form of cooperation, which is a solution
that is not really usual in our relations with third countries.
1.4.3 Common Rules Concerning Officers’ Rights While Acting Abroad
The European instruments (EU and Schengen) and the bilateral agreements contain
specific rules concerning the use of force against individuals by foreign officers.
Carrying
service
weapon Use of service weapon Use of other force Right to arrest
SAAC
surveillance
Yes Legitimate self
defence
Not regulated No
SAAC
hot pursuit
Yes Legitimate self
defence
Security search,
handcuff, seizure
Yes, the person
pursued
Austria (both
surveillance
and hot
pursuit)
Yes Justifiable defence or
necessity (forum
regit actum is not
defined therefore:
home country law)
Bodily force or any
coercive
measures—if it is
proportionate
Yes, in case of
flagrante
delicto OR in
case of escape
Romania (both
surveillance
and hot
pursuit)
Yes Justifiable defence or
necessity (forum
regit actum is not
defined therefore:
home country law)
Bodily force, handcuff,
taser, baton and
police dog—if it is
proportionate
Forum regit actum
Yes, in case of
flagrante
delicto OR in
case of escape
Slovenia (both
surveillance
and hot
pursuit)
Yes Justifiable defence or
necessity (forum
regit actum is not
defined therefore:
home country law)
bodily force, handcuff,
taser, baton and
police dog—if it is
proportionate
Forum regit actum
yes, in case of
flagrante
delicto OR in
case of escape
Slovakia (both
surveillance
and hot
pursuit)
Yes Justifiable defence or
necessity (forum
regit actum is not
defined therefore:
home country law)
Bodily force, handcuff,
taser, baton and
police dog—if it is
proportionate
Forum regit actum
Yes, in case of
flagrante
delicto OR in
case of escape
Croatia (both
surveillance
and hot
pursuit)
Yes Justifiable defence
(forum regit actum
is not defined
therefore: home
country law)
Bodily force, handcuff,
taser, baton and
police dog—if it is
proportionate
Forum regit actum
Yes, in case of
flagrante
delicto OR in
case of escape
Serbia No No No No
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According to this comparison there are some dissimilarities to note. First of all,
the SAAC does not provide for the use of service weapons in case of necessity;
however, almost every other agreement covers this eventuality. The agreement with
Croatia forbids Hungarian officers using their weapons in Croatia and vice versa.
Secondly, the use of coercive measures is also not uniformly addressed: with
Austria, the proportionality principle is followed without any detailed list of
applicable measures, but in the other agreements, there is an exhaustive list of
measures and the requirement of proportionality is also provided for.
If we look for reasons why the agreement with Serbia differs in this respect from
that with Croatia (both third countries), one might be that the status of Croatia in the
accession process is more developed than that of Serbia. However, there are some
special local necessities which call for special regulation of the relations between
Serbia and Hungary; therefore, the agreement contains rules on establishing a joint
investigation team.12
But there is also another important ruling concerning activities abroad. The SCA
and its implementing agreements acknowledge the principle of assimilation,13
which has three elements:
(i) During operations such as cross-border surveillance, hot pursuit, and controlled
delivery, foreign officers are to be regarded as officers of the hosting country
with respect to offences committed (a) against them or (b) by them.
(ii) The same is valid if (c) said officers cause damage during the operation, in such
case the claims are treated under the conditions applicable to damage caused by
the officers of the hosting country.
When service weapons are used, the question arises: which law is to be applied
in order to decide on the existence of justifiable defence or necessity? Enforcement
of the principle of assimilation would mean that the content of the hosting country’s
legal regulation would be applied.14 The forum regit actum principle, which
dominates the new measures in the field of cooperation in criminal matters, also
calls for the application of the host country’s law.
Therefore the knowledge of the law of neighbouring states is crucial in this
regard since the officers themselves may be in a position to apply a foreign law very
different from their own during their operations.
Why is this important to note? I think that these operational acts could be very
effective for certain purposes; therefore, I am sure that the use of these measures
12 Joint investigation teams shall be established in case of offences with minimum 5 years
imprisonment with transnational aspect, when the successful investigation requires the coordina-
tion of the investigating authorities or if the investigation is very complex.
13 See Hecker (2010), pp. 227–264.
14 During these operations the foreign officers are to be regarded as officers of the hosting country
with respect to offences committed against them or by them. The same is valid if the officer causes
damage during his/her operation, in such a case the claims shall be treated under the conditions
applicable to damage caused by the officers of the hosting country.
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will intensify between the member states in the future. However, the application of
foreign law might fall within a “danger zone” of misinterpretations.
2 Cross-Border Investigations and Fundamental Rights
2.1 Legal Environment
First of all it should be noted that Hungary has ratified all the significant interna-
tional conventions in the field of human rights protection:
Before the democratic change the UN ICCPR was ratified by Law-Decree
8/1976; the UN ICAT was ratified by Law-Decree 3/1988.
On 6 November 1990 Hungary joined the European Council; this was followed
by the Parliament’s ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 (ECHR) under the
Act Nr. XXXI of 1993. The ECAT was ratified by Act III of 1995.
This means that both Hungarian legislation and the functioning of the state’s
institutions are bound by these instruments. After the accession to the Rome
Convention, there were cases before the ECtHR against Hungary, to the tune of
ca. 400 applications per year (of which only 30–50 applications are admitted). The
decided cases show that the legislator, if the ECtHR establishes the violation of the
Convention, is (almost) always able and willing to change the law in order to avoid
similar complaints.15
2.2 Special Extraordinary Remedy
It is noteworthy to mention that a key feature of Hungarian criminal procedure is
Article 416 HCP, which sets forth a special extraordinary remedy for certain cases
of human rights violations.
Judicial review of a final judgment can be initiated before the Hungarian
Supreme Court, based upon strict requirements in special cases. One of these
requirements bears a close connection with human rights protection. Namely, it
might happen that an international body for the protection of human rights (partic-
ularly the ECtHR) establishes that the procedure or the legally binding decision of a
Hungarian court (criminal or other procedure) has violated a provision of the
ECHR. In this case, the Hungarian CCP allows the Supreme Court review of the
case addressed by the decision of the international judicial body. The decision of
the ECHR can disapprove of both factual and legal defects in the national procedure
15 See more concerning Hungarian framework: Ba´rd (2007), pp. 237–241; Czine et al. (2009), pp.
209–237.
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from a human rights point of view; however, according to Article 416(3) of the
Hungarian CCP, Supreme Court review is not allowed if the human rights violation
alleged is merely the infringement of the reasonable time requirement. The exclu-
sion has a procedural reason: the persons concerned (defendant, his counsel and the
private party) have the right to complain against any delay or procedural omission
of the competent authorities during the whole trial procedure. If one finds that the
authorities infringed the reasonable time requirement of fair trial, they are not
obliged to wait for the opening of the possibility to apply in Strasbourg; instead,
they have earlier access to the proper proceedings in remedy of the infringements
suffered before the trial court (Art. 262/A Hungarian CCP).16
Naturally, procedural mistakes or abuses resulting in human rights violations can
be remedied by conventional means at any time during the whole procedure. This
special case is intended to deal with any situation which cannot be handled or is not
to be handled by ordinary proceedings.
3 Obtaining and Admitting Evidence and Respect for Human
Rights Guarantees
3.1 Introduction
This section focuses on the admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings,
whether the court takes into consideration (allows into the proceedings) evidence
of foreign origin, traditionally received via formal mutual assistance. The accepted
principles and institutions of this “traditional” system are very sovereignty-
friendly; neither the requesting nor the executing state must forfeit their own
legal standards: the act of mutual assistance must be executed according to the
law of the executing state, but afterwards, the judge is free in making the decision
whether the evidence obtained should be allowed to be entered in the requesting
state’s procedure.17
This philosophy dominates the instruments of the Council of Europe and the first
legislative steps in the framework of the Union. In the European Union, the
aforementioned traditional way of thinking has been changed, and a new era
began about 10 years ago,18 namely the principle of mutual recognition19 among
member states. The principle of mutual recognition in connection with cooperation
in criminal matters continues to gain ground as double punishability becomes less
16 Karsai and Szomora (2010), p. 207.
17More in Ligeti (2006) and Gleß (2003).
18 The framework-decision on the European Arrest Warrant has recognized this new attitude for
the first time as a positive legal provision.
19 See Alegre and Leaf (2004), pp. 200–217; Peers (2004), pp. 5–36.
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and less relevant in EU law. The European Council proclaimed in Tampere (15–16
October 1999) that the principle of mutual recognition should become the corner-
stone of judicial cooperation even in criminal matters in the EU—the proclamation
of the Presidency Conclusions lead to this “dramatic” change.20
Subsequent EU legislation introduced mutual recognition of other decisions of
domestic authorities, such as the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and
confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime (in accordance with
the Framework Decision on money laundering); the execution in the European
Union of orders freezing property or evidence (in accordance with the pertinent
Framework Decision under the same title); the application of the principle of
mutual recognition to financial penalties (in accordance with the pertinent Frame-
work Decision); or the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confis-
cation orders (in accordance with the relevant Framework Decision). As these
measures accumulate, the principle of mutual recognition has become the central
element of the development in EU criminal law.21
Generally speaking, this process has advanced in such a way that it would be a
mistake to speak of widespread, common acceptance of mutual recognition in
national decisions on criminal matters. Only some types of decisions accept and
apply mutual recognition, leading to the concept of the ‘fragmented acceptance
doctrine’ as a way of describing the trends in the shift from double punishability to
mutual recognition. Despite incomplete, fragmented acceptance, the ongoing leg-
islative efforts in the EU seem to be progressing toward the promise of a true
expansion and the general acknowledgement of mutual recognition regarding
criminal decisions of all types. Eventually, it might even achieve the ultimate
goal: “the free movement” of judicial decisions in criminal matters. The goal of
mutual recognition is to create a framework where the decisions passed under the
respective legal systems of the member states share, during their execution in
another member state, the legal attributes of decisions under the domestic law of
the host state: they should not diverge from the basic features applicable to “interior
legal assistance.”22
The Lisbon Treaty imposes a general rule of acknowledgment in terms of mutual
recognition upon the European Union: Article 67(2) TFEU provides that
The Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent
and combat crime, racism and xenophobia, and through measures for coordination and
cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities, as well
as through the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and, if necessary,
through the approximation of criminal laws.
Article 82 TFEU in particular declares that judicial cooperation in criminal
matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of
20 Ligeti (2006), p. 140.
21 Fuchs (2004), pp. 368–371; Gleß (2004), pp. 354–367.
22 This legal instrument is used for example if the municipal court requests some procedural acts
(in the criminal procedure) from the court of another town in the same country.
430 K. Karsai
karsai.krisztina@juris.u-szeged.hu
judgments. According to paragraph 2, to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual
recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the European Parliament and
the Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. They shall also concern the mutual
admissibility of evidence between member states.
The legal foundation for the free movement of evidence has already been laid,
and further development in this field cannot be obstructed. The question remains
open: what aspects of this “freedom” will be realised in practice? In order to
understand the mutual recognition of evidence, I would like to provide a short
summary of what the principle truly means.
3.2 The Principle of Mutual Recognition as a Judgement-Less
(Neutral) Method23
In my view, the principle of mutual recognition, as it says in its name, is a
method without value judgement and essentially has three factors. The first factor
is the object of recognition; and the recognition itself is accomplished between
the other two factors (remitter entity and receiver entity). Acceptance mainly
consists in the receiver’s acknowledgment (adoption) of the object of recognition
as the remitter offers it to him or as the remitter treats it. In the sphere of law it
means the following: a legal act is accepted by an entity—which is independent
of the original issuing entity—in its original scope and depth without any
modification, as it is originated from the issuing entity. The principle contains
an element of automatic recognition (without any change in substance or form of
the legal figure), meaning that the remitter has the “claim” that its legal product
not will be changed. The receiver is the concrete member state’s law system (or
the judicial authority), the objective of recognition—in the widest sense—is any
legal product of criminal procedure (decisions, coercive measures, evidences),
and the member states’s law, from whence the legal product comes, is the
remitter.
The principle of mutual recognition is restricted to interstate relations, since the
remitter and the receiver entities belong to different legal systems. But this inter-
state relation does not necessarily entail an international law context, as the
interaction does not take place between states themselves as bodies of their own
sovereignty but between the concrete judicial authorities representing states. One or
two foreign elements appear during the carrying out of nationally-framed criminal
procedures: the accused or any of the witnesses resides abroad or the evidence (or
seized objects) stays abroad. The enforcement of criminal jurisdiction and the
carrying out of a criminal procedure is situated in a national framework of law
23More in Karsai (2008), pp. 948–954.
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but national law becomes inadequate if a substantial element of or actor in the
procedure is to be found abroad. This foreign element should be made—also
physically—admissible (the goal of international cooperation in criminal matters)
and if it is admissible and present, it should be made compatible (procedure of
exequatur24) with the domestic law system. The legal assistance coming from a
foreign legal system can still show the characteristics of its own system, and these
may violate the law of the implementing state if the characteristics are not recon-
cilable. It is at this point that the principle of mutual recognition appears, potentially
replacing the transformation’s acts of internal compatibility.
The principle of mutual recognition as a judgement-less (neutral) method theoreti-
cally might work in connection with every single legal product of criminal procedure.
The principle of mutual recognition is functional: it concentrates on using the legal
product in question everywhere for the same reason and the same way as it was
originally made. This means that it has to fulfil the same function in the receiver’s
frame of reference as in its own. The greatest problem of the principle of mutual
recognition as a method in the criminal law context is that the legal products (legal
institutions functioning in one legal system) cannot be independent of their system.
They will alwaysmaintain the characteristics of their own legal system. As the subject
of mutual recognition, the legal product itself will never be suitable for recognition:
recognition necessarily means the recognition of the entire other legal system.
The effect of the mutual recognition principle would ultimately be to create a
single criminal jurisdiction in the European Union. There would be no conflicting
legislation and the relation among the acting authorities would be governed by
traditional internal provisions for competence and jurisdiction. This is dubbed
cosmopolitan jurisdiction by Franz von Liszt, in which the attitude of the states is
described as “your law is my law.”25 Such a system is held together by the
constructive confidence put by the member states in one another’s jurisdiction, a
point from which the present day is far removed. Today, there are complaints filed
by member states on both sides of the procedure and debates about how to deal with
human rights deficits. Although each member state (and in the near future the EU
itself as well) is participant to the ECHR, the volume of cases before the ECtHR
also shows that the minimum standards laid down by the Convention are not
guaranteed in practice. This also means that the recognition of a criminal law
product should entail the recognition of domestic procedural provisions with their
necessary (or expressed or regulated) protection of human rights. But this aspect is
not always acceptable to different member states with different levels of human
right protection in practice.
The principle of mutual recognition originates in the European Court of Justice’s
jurisdiction, specifically in connection with the free movement of goods in the
decision known as Cassis de Dijon.26 Following this decision, mutual recognition
24Nyitrai Peter (2006), pp. 299–300.
25 von Liszt (1882), p. 102.
26 120/78 REWE-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fu¨r Branntwein [ECR 1979 649.p.].
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became one of the most important regulatory principles of Community law in
furthering the fundamental freedoms. It gave birth to the idea27 that the principle
might be followed in criminal procedural cooperation and substantive criminal
integration as well. This is what leads—similar to the free movement of goods—
to the theory of the free movement of criminal decisions. In the territory of the
European Union, in the “united jurisdictional area,” a legal decision made by a
member state’s authority is qualified the same way, and it produces the same legal
effect as in the legal system of the issuing member state.
Under Union law, the principle of mutual recognition is an instrument for
reaching the fundamental freedoms adopted by EU law; concretely it means the
achievement of EU citizens’ economic freedom. The central element of mutual
recognition in connection with the free movement of goods is the following: after a
concrete good is legally put on the market in a member state, it can circulate in all
the others. The subject of mutual recognition is not the goods itself (like a
television, cucumbers, or wine) but rather the member state regulation which lays
down how to place the goods on the (common) market for the first time. The other
member states recognize the lawfulness of these rules, accept them, and conse-
quently also accept their further free trade within the European Union. It is
important to note that the trade-provisions can vary in member states. Nevertheless,
these domestic norms first have to conform to EU law requirements and further-
more this conformity has a higher (supranational) control instance in the form of the
European Court of Justice. Accordingly, member state’s regulations, which define
the rules of trade nationally, have to fulfil external, objective requirements that are
enforced the same way in every member state. EU law itself provides the frame: it
sets forth the means of enforcement of the fundamental freedom and its possible
limitation as well. If the rules of the member states fall within these frames, they
will always fulfil EU law requirements.
3.3 Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters
According to the aforementioned EU law sense of mutual recognition, the subject
of the recognition is not the decision itself (since the goods are not being recognized
in relation to the free movement of goods) but rather the recognition that the
Member state’s procedure leads to a lawful decision. The use of mutual recognition
and the free movement of decisions in criminal matters would mean that if a
decision is lawfully made then it could be enforced in any of the Member states.
The present situation is that some, but not all, decisions are covered by mutual
recognition. The natural question is: why the double standard?
27 For the first time, in the Conclusions of the European Council, Tampere (15–16 October 1999).
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The process started with the European Arrest Warrant, but without letting each
decision fall under the scope of mutual recognition, the circle has gradually
broadened. There is no confirmed contextual reason, and the question is still
open: why do all the decisions passed by judges not fall under mutual recognition?
In my point of view the real reason is that mutual confidence is still not yet full.
The EU characteristics of mutual recognition could be enforced for criminal
decisions if there were an “external” frame binding over all the member states’
substantive legal frameworks similar to the mutual recognition regarding goods.
Such an external frame could be e.g. the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
for fundamental rights protections.
3.4 Free Movement of Evidence
The FD EEW tries to provide a single, fast and effective mechanism for obtaining
evidence and transferring it to the issuing state. The framework decision applies to
objects, documents or data obtained under various procedural powers, including
seizure, production or search powers in any member states.28 The EEW should be
used where the evidence is already directly available in the executing State, for
example by extracting the relevant information from a register (such as a register of
criminal convictions). The vision of free movement of evidence makes the question
more complicated. According to the concept of evidence exchange, the new system
would replace most of the existing cooperation in procedural assistance. The
principle of forum regit actum would give way to locus regit actum and a higher
level of cooperation. But what could be actually recognized by the member states
with mutual recognition of evidence? (1) Does the evidence obtained legally
qualify as evidence? (2) Is the evidence obtained admissible as evidence?
The probative value of evidence cannot be the subject ofmutual recognition, as it is
a question of the firm belief and inner conviction of the judge. The question about a
fact being a fact also cannot be the subject of mutual recognition, since real evidence
such as blood or a signature are the same in all the other member states. What is left is
the “transformation” proceeding, during which facts become evidence; this is a legal
one, and the procedural rules of the state provide the normative framework for the
“transformation.” If a fact appears in onemember state as evidence then it (i.e. the fact
that this evidence exists) has to be recognized. In this case the receiver state receives
the existence of the fact already as evidence. But the same problem burdens this aspect
of mutual recognition. Namely, the evidence, as the output of this transformation
process, also bears the marks of the procedural regulation, for example procedural
violations of a suspect’s human rights. Consequently, in a non-national context, if the
evidence needs to be “distributed” to another member state of the European Union,
another State should automatically accept the validity of the procedural rules of the
28Gazeas (2005), pp. 18 ff., see more in Hecker (2007).
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other state. While there are no objective strict standards29 for the creation of
“distributable” evidence, an automatic recognition system would lead to the recogni-
tion of every procedural rule in the member states. But such confidence does not exist
today between the member states; mutual recognition cannot work in this context
adequately, and will not as long as there is no common system of norms, contextual
standards and judicial control.30
3.5 Breaking Points
The mutual confidence placed in other member states’ judicial systems as a
principle is in an ideal case a declaration which defines an existing phenomenon
and custom. At present, this is only an illusion. The EU’s and the member states’
furtherance of the illusion is perhaps understandable as reaching for a theoretical
foundation for further integration, but the illusion breaks the moment any claims are
made about the total or partial reality of unconditional integration of the member
states’ legal systems. The principle of mutual recognition might easily let law
enforcement authorities engage in forum shopping. Choosing the place for de
facto jurisdiction (if the case has transnational aspects) might become a strategic
decision on the basis of the place for the lowest intervention limits, i.e., the member
state with the loosest human rights’ protection system. The efficiency factor in
connection with decision-making might lead to forum shopping.
3.6 Recommended Approaches
An EEW should be issued only where obtaining the objects, documents or data
sought is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of the criminal or other
proceedings concerned. In addition, an EEW should be issued only where the
object, documents or data concerned could be obtained under the national law of
the issuing State in a comparable case (point 11 of the Consideranda). The system
of EEW permits the issuing authority to request the proceedings be carried out
according to the law of issuing State, but in the absence of this request, the default
rules are the rules of the executing state. If the request is given, the executing
authority is obliged to use the foreign law with the exception of cases where the
requested procedures are contrary to its fundamental principles of law. This system
29 The human rights standards of the ECHR are not enough in this field, as it binds only the
separate Member States, the legislation of the European Union is not covered by this standards in
this field.
30 To the development in this field see the Green Paper from the Commission on Procedural
Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union,
COM(2003) 75 of 19 February 2003.
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is to be implemented by the member states however there is some skepticism
concerning, among other things, the capability of the instrument for safeguarding
human rights. This conference and the contributions of different speakers31 have
shown that the search for adequate solution for future development is not limited to
the field of evidence-transfer.
The EEW is not a perfect system,32 but it has very important added value to the
“European Rules of Evidence,” namely the refutable presumption of legality33 and
the guarantee of human rights during the obtaining process in another country. The
EEW system is a new approach which precludes the general objection of origin
against evidence from a foreign country: evidence from another Member state is
now to be treated as legally obtained evidence. This approach can be classified as a
rebuttable presumption: if doubts surface later in the issuing State that the obtained
and “recognized” evidence is unlawful (because of breach of procedural rules of
executing State or of human rights) the judge is entitled to exclude or disallow that
evidence. But it should be underlined that generally, the judge will presume the
conformity of the evidence, and there is no need to establish a special system of
controlling the procedures conducted in another country in every case before its
“recognition.” The need for a special control procedure may be justified only if
indications of breach are apparent. A potentially EU-level control procedure (for
instance as an amendment to the framework decision) can be relevant only for this
situation. This situation accounts for both the possibility of violation of “simple”
procedural provisions and human rights.
In the latter case, the judge can surely test (because of the common minimum
level of protecting human rights in Europe) conformity with human rights and
whether the obtaining process constituted an infringement of human rights
requirements. Hence, this model constitutes a mutual control of human rights
protections by the domestic judges. However, it remains questionable in case of
doubt and indication how the judge will be able to prove conformity with the
foreign rules, since it is not to be expected that the domestic judge knows the
evidence law of all EU countries.34 This is probably a focal point where the EU
could further its legislative efforts to fill a gap: it could be reasonable to establish a
system of special cooperation between the judicial authorities (or between
appointed judges) focused on questions about evidence gathering. Or it could also
be possible to allow Eurojust to check the questionable national evidence gathering
process in specific cases of controversy. It would not be a general procedure
31 See Ruggeri and Hecker, above.
32 Critical opinions from Hecker (2007), p. 36; Gleß (2003), pp. 131–150; Belfiore (2009),
pp. 1–150.
33 Karsai (2010), pp. 124–125.
34 The general rule is the locus regit actum principle; therefore—without special request—the
evidence gathering follows the law of executing State. Therefore the issuing authority will get
“foreign” evidence establishing by the law of another country.
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because of the aforementioned presumptions but a remedial procedure in case of
any suspicion of procedural law and human rights law violations.
4 Cooperation with International Courts
4.1 International Tribunals
Hungary belonged to the group of so-called “like-minded states” during the
negotiations on the Statute of the International Criminal Court and its enthusiasm
about the ICC did not chill in the following time. Hungary is intent on ratifying the
Statute, but the necessary legal steps have not been taken yet. The Hungarian
Parliament decided on 6 February 2006 via a non-binding resolution to ratify the
Statute, but the resolution was not followed by ratification via formal legislative act.
Nevertheless one can find several legal sources linked to the Statute. There was a
constitutional obstacle for full implementation of the Statute as an organic part of
Hungarian law, since the Head of the State may never undergo an investigation or
prosecution by any means pursuant to the current constitution (in force until 31
December 2011).
There are some drafts of possible ratifying legislation, although the controversial
constitutional interpretations (whether the amendment of the Hungarian Constitu-
tion is needed or not) blocks the adoption of this formal act.35 Hopefully the new
Fundamental Law of Hungary will eliminate the various interpretations and the
formal ratification of the Statute will be realised.
The legal situation concerning ad hoc tribunals is simpler because the relevant
Security Council decisions have been directly transformed into Acts of Parliament.
However, have so far been no requests for cooperation or judicial assistance
from these bodies.
4.2 The Influence of Supranational Case-Law
The influence of the ECtHR has been already mentioned here. The Court of Justice
of the European Union does not have special influence on transnational criminal
inquiries themselves. The general impact of the Court’s jurisprudence on national
law is not doubted here, but it does not have any special features in this area.
Furthermore, there has not yet been any Hungarian example of a valid complaint
concerning the sui generis transnational investigative activities (cross-border
“investigations”), and therefore no specifically relevant case-law in this regard.
35 Nevertheless, the Republic of Hungary already adopted the ratification act of the Agreement on
the privileges and immunities of the International Criminal Court (Act 31 from year 2006).
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It should be noted that the complexity of European law (and human rights law
of “Europe”) has made it necessary for the judicial system to establish a network of
EU Law Advisors of the courts. These experts (judges) follow the recent case law of
ECJ and ECtHR and support the decision making of their colleagues with European
law knowledge.
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